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Kokoda Papers
The Kokoda Papers are the major research reports published
by the Foundation. They are normally the product of a major,
multi-disciplinary research project involving contributions
from many serving and retired experts. Occasionally the Board
of the Foundation may authorise the publication of another research
product of exceptionally high worth as a Kokoda Paper . Some
3-6 Kokoda Papers are scheduled for publication annually.
Kokoda Paper No. 8 (May 2008) |
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Strategic Decision-Making: Optimising Australia’s National Security Planning and Coordination for 2015 |
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This report is about optimising Australia’s highest level national security decision-making. It examines the workings of the National Security Committee (NSC) of the Australian Cabinet and the various other committees and arrangements that support high-level national security decision-making in Australia.
How have Australia’s highest level national security decision-making systems performed in recent years? What aspects have worked well and what have been sub-optimal? What lessons can be learnt from the national security decision-making systems of the United States, Britain, Sweden and Singapore?
This report concludes that there are some aspects of Australia’s high-level national security decision-making system that are truly outstanding and the envy of senior officials in other countries |
However there are also aspects of National Security Committee operations and systems that are less than optimal and should be improved. Indeed, if left unattended, some current weaknesses will become much more serious problems during the coming decade |
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Kokoda Paper No. 7 (May 2008) |
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Skin in the Game: Realising Australia’s National Interests in Space to 2025 |
Space is no longer the sole preserve of the national security community. Australia is dependent on foreign owned and operated satellites for basic services such as timing and navigation, communications and remote sensing. However, Australia has very little influence in the bodies that govern and regulate the peaceful use of space-based utilities. Any disruption or denial of these services will have a negative impact not only on national security but also on the economic and social well-being of the nation.
Australia has been spared the substantial costs associated with investing in the development and sustainment of national space capabilities. These investments were met largely through alliance relationships, in particular with the United States. Australia gained significant strategic and operational benefit from space-based utilities by permitting ground stations to be based on its soil. This situation is no longer sufficient. |
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New technologies have reduced the traditional barriers to operating satellites. An increasing number of nations and commercial bodies are developing space-based capabilities. In turn, as the competition intensifies, so the risk weapons being deployed into space also grows. In order to participate as a middle level power in the emerging debates about space security, many of which have global implications, Australia must put ‘skin in the game’ to ensure it has a confident, credible and respected voice. This report outlines a modest investment program that will allow Australia to protect and advance its national interests in space into the future. |
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Kokoda Paper No. 6 (launched February 2008) |
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Strategic Tides: Positioning Australia’s Security Policy to 2050 |
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Strategic Tides is a major new study that examines Australia’s strategic prospects and the decisions that Australia will need to make. This Kokoda Paper considers the major forces that are shaping Australia’s strategic environment and conditioning Australia’s future strategic choices. It argues that a reactive, incrementalist approach will only serve to compound complexity. The emerging economic (and population) powerhouses of China and India, the evolving nature of US power, the looming contest between the liberal values of the West and the absolutist values of radicalised Islam and the many troubles of the small nations of the Pacific are dramatically reshaping Australia’s strategic environment. Consequently, Australia’s future strategic position will be determined as much by the quality of its policy initiatives in the field of strategic security as by the effectiveness of its responses to emergent situations. |
Future Australian governments will need to establish the parameters within which they can exercise their strategic options, to Australia’s strategic advantage and that of the near region. And while those parameters will need to have inbuilt flexibility and encourage agility in decision-making, there must also be clarity and agreement on those things for which Australia is willing to fight. The solution requires the disciplined development of integrated force options based on careful analysis of emergent strategic fault lines, scientific innovation that exploits technology rather than the overworked members of the ADF, capability acquisition that delivers real value for the dollars spent, partnership between government and industry that substantiates the fact that defence is a whole of nation enterprise – and, above all else, decision-making systems that are robust and quick. It requires a change in policy mindset that will create the conditions where the synergies between strategic diplomacy and decisive lethality are combined into a purposive, long-term security strategy. |
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Kokoda Paper No. 5 (October 2007) |
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Firepower to Win: Australian Defence Force Joint Fires in 2020 |
by Alan Titheridge, Gary Waters, Ross Babbage |
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The Australian Defence Force’s future combat success will depend on an effective ‘Joint Fires’ capability. Joint Fires is demanding and complicated as it requires close inter-service coordination, is often time-sensitive, usually entails the delivery of lethal force, and its consequences can be far-reaching. Significant progress has been made in recent years in developing both an integrated system and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers to coordinate Joint Fires in forward locations; however, a great deal remains to be done.
This Kokoda Paper investigates the main issues that the Australian Defence Force should be considering as it develops its Joint Fires capability for 2020. This Paper recommends developing future Joint Fires as a system, leveraging an advanced synthetic environment for training and exercising, strengthening the communications network, striving for information and decision superiority, improving the adaptability and flexibility of command and control, adopting a national effects-based approach, and becoming international leaders in Joint Fires’ education and training. |
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| Kokoda Paper No. 4 (April 2007) |
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Australia's Future Underwater Operations and System Requirements |
by Ross Babbage |
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If the Australian Defence Force is to be in a position to accept the new-generation underwater capabilities when HMAS Collins phases out of service in 2025, a great deal will need to happen quickly. Most importantly, the research, studies, trials and investigations into options for the next generation of underwater systems will need to be completed within the coming three years. By late 2011, the Australian Government will need to take clear decisions about which projects will proceed during 'first pass' consideration. At the time of 'second pass' consideration in 2014-2015, government will need to decide all primary elements of these programs, together with the key features of a rapidly-paced acquisition plan. Construction contracts would subsequently be let with the first submarine of the new class probably completing trials in 2024 and entering service in 2025.
This Kokoda Paper investigates the main issues that the Australian Government should be considering about its future underwater operations and system requirements. This paper shows that underwater forces will become even more important to Australia's security over the next twenty-to-thirty years especially as these forces develop an increasingly broader role in future military operations. Maintaining an underwater force will require a significant outlay, but continued investment in this area could provide Australia with a real advantage over those who rely on the sea, but fail to invest in forces able able to protect or exploit this domain. |
| Kokoda Paper No. 3 (April 2007) |
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National Security Community 2020:
Six Practical Recommendations for the Australian Government |
by David Connery |
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Australian Government has done well to adapt its structures, instruments, processes and legislation for national security policymaking since 2001. However, more changes will be needed if the system is to remain relevant in the increasingly demanding and complex security environment of the next decade.
This Kokoda Paper - which has been developed in consultation with experts inside the Australian Government, the states, business, not-for-profit groups and academia - examines national security policymaking in Australia and proposes six recommendations to develop a 'national security community'. The recommendations include a proposal to examine the method for creating a national security strategy; changes to the division of ministerial responsibility between the Attorney General and his 'junior minister' ; a suggestion to create an operational strategy that integrates national power; measures to improve training and education for national security professionals; new 'national security outreach officers'; and a crisis coordination centre for domestic security incidents. |
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| Kokoda Paper No. 2 (October 2005) |
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Australia's Future Joint Strike Fighter fleet: How much is too little? |
by Peter Nicholson and David Connery |
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The
Australian Government is about to decide whether to spend up
to A$16.5 billion dollars to purchase a fleet of Joint Strike
Fighters: but there is debate within defence circles about just
how big that fleet should be. This report examines the factors
that will influence the size of Australia’s air combat
force, before examining what three different fighter fleets
can achieve—and the risks that will need to be accepted
with each fleet.
While
force structuring is often a question of ‘how much is
enough?’, this report contends that the stealth, speed,
precision firepower and significant range of new information
capabilities means that the main question concerning the future
Joint Strike Fighter fleet will be whether the Government is
buying enough of these aircraft to meet Australia‘s strategic
needs. |
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| Kokoda Paper No. 1 (October 2005) |
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Preparing Australia's Defence for 2020: Transformation or Reform? |
by Ross Babbage |
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This
report reveals a consensus amongst senior defence experts that
many parts of the Australian Defence Organisation are under
severe stress and will be unsustainable in the long term. Already
some important functions are being neglected, management systems
and processes have been weakened and the overall performance
of the Defence Organisation away from military operational theatres
has declined. This report discusses what needs to be done, and
asks whether a dramatic transformation or, rather, a more gradual
process of defence reform is required. |
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